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Abstract 
 
It has long been assumed that people experience evaluative conflict or ambivalence as 
unpleasant. In three studies we provide direct evidence for the assumption that ambivalence is 
unpleasant, but only when one has to commit to one side of the issue. In those situations 
ambivalence will be related to outcome uncertainty and feelings of discomfort. We examined 
his prediction using both self-reports and physiological measures. In a first study we 
manipulated ambivalence and whether or not participants had to take a clear stand vis-a vis 
the attitudinal issue and choose a position for or against it. Results indicate ambivalence was 
only related to physiological arousal when a choice had to be made. Feeling ambivalent about 
an issue without the necessity to choose did not result in higher levels of arousal. A second 
study replicated and extended these findings by including a measure of subjective uncertainty 
about the decision. Results showed the same pattern as in Study 1, and indicate that the 
relation between ambivalence and arousal is mediated by uncertainty about decisional 
outcomes. In the third and final study these findings are corroborated using self-report 
measures; these indicated that ambivalence-induced discomfort is related to specific 
(negative) emotions. 
(197 words) 
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Ambivalence and decisional conflict as a cause of psychological discomfort: Feeling tense 
when jumping off the fence 
 
Generally people like to see themselves as consistent, and prefer thoughts, feelings and 
behaviors to be in accordance with each other. Inconsistency is often experienced as 
unpleasant. For example, when we realize we acted unfriendly toward someone we like, the 
inconsistency between attitude and behavior can lead to feelings of discomfort. Several 
theories in social psychology address this preference for evaluative consistency. Two seminal 
examples are balance theory (Heider, 1946) and cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 
1957). Research evidence indicates that people are motivated to reduce inconsistencies, and 
assume that this tendency is caused by the unpleasantness of evaluative conflict. Direct 
evidence for this assumption is provided by research on cognitive dissonance showing a 
positive relation between dissonance and physiological arousal (Croyle & Cooper, 1983).  
Given that inconsistencies between attitudes or between attitudes and behavior are 
unpleasant, we expect evaluative inconsistencies within attitudes also to be unpleasant. Such 
attitudes, containing strong positive and negative thoughts (or feelings), are known as 
ambivalent attitudes. It has been argued that ambivalence is unpleasant (Newby-Clark, 
McGregor, & Zanna, 2002), but empirical evidence is scarce.  
Some indirect empirical evidence for this assumption was obtained in studies on 
ambivalence and depth of processing. Jonas, Diehl and Brömer (1997) suggest that 
uncertainty about ones attitude can facilitate the motivation to invest cognitive effort (see also 
Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989). They argue that uncertainty is unpleasant and that people 
are motivated to end this aversive state. For this reason ambivalent attitude holders are 
expected to process attitude relevant information thoroughly. Jonas and colleagues (1997) and 
Maio, Bell and Esses (1996) found support for this view and showed that ambivalent attitudes 
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are related to more thorough, systematic processing of information. Nordgren, van Harreveld, 
and van der Pligt (2006) replicated and extended these findings by showing that this relation 
disappears once participants do not attribute their arousal to their ambivalence but to 
something else.  
Direct evidence for a relation between ambivalence and discomfort is limited. Hass, 
Katz, Rizzo, Bailey, and Moore (1992) examined the relation between intergroup 
ambivalence and negative affect, and found that racial ambivalence is related to a more 
negative mood. Maio, Greenland, Bernard, and Esses (2001) on the other hand measured skin 
conductance level and (surprisingly) found a negative correlation between ambivalence and 
physiological arousal.  
The present studies address the issue of the unpleasantness of ambivalence and focuses 
on when ambivalence is especially unpleasant. Newby-Clark, McGregor, and Zanna, (2002) 
argued that ambivalence is only experienced as uncomfortable when the positive and negative 
component of the attitude are simultaneously accessible. Only then does the ambivalent 
attitude holder become aware of his or her conflicting thoughts or feelings (see also de Liver, 
van der Pligt, & Wigboldus, 2007). Newby-Clark et al. also suggested that ambivalence is 
unpleasant for similar reasons as dissonance. An important difference between ambivalence 
and dissonance is however that the former is largely a pre-decisional phenomenon, while 
dissonance generally concerns post-decisional conflict between attitudes and behavior. This 
may explain the conflicting findings of ambivalence on discomfort. Ambivalent attitude 
holders often ‘sit on the fence’; they have not committed themselves by making a choice 
between their opposing behavioral beliefs.  
This does not mean that ambivalence is never unpleasant. The distinction between 
judgment and choice can help to predict when ambivalence is unpleasant. Hogarth (1981) 
illustrates the difference between the judgment and choice by comparing them to taking aim 
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and actually shooting. The judgment (taking aim) is non-committal, pulling the trigger 
however commits one to the judgment. For the ambivalent attitude holder, having to commit 
to one alternative should be unpleasant because neither alternative is entirely satisfying and 
both are associated with uncertain outcomes. Similarly, Hogarth (1981) argues that the 
anticipation of commitment can already lead to feelings of conflict. We therefore expect 
ambivalence to be unpleasant due to the anticipation of uncertain outcomes of ones choice. 
In the present studies we aim to show that the anticipation of commitment is crucial in 
causing ambivalence-induced discomfort. More specifically we argue that when people are 
ambivalent and a choice needs to be made, conflict and feelings of discomfort will arise. 
When the situation does not involve choice, and commitment can thus remain low, there is 
less reason for discomfort, even when feeling ambivalent.  
 
Study 1 
 
Our aim is to examine whether ambivalence is particularly stressful when an attitude relevant 
choice has to be made.  In order to address this question, we experimentally manipulate 
ambivalence and assess participants’ Skin Conductance Level (SCL) as a measure of 
physiological arousal.  
The attitude object was the potential introduction of a new labor law in the 
Netherlands, similar to the one that caused turmoil in France during the first months of 2006. 
This law would make it easier for employers to hire and fire young people and caused 
hundreds of thousands of people to protest against this law in France. On the other hand, some 
were very much in favor because it might offer more opportunities for young people. 
Dependent on experimental condition, participants read either a univalent (negative) or an 
ambivalent text about such a law in the Netherlands. After reading this article, ambivalence 
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and overall attitude were measured and we manipulated whether or not ambivalent attitude 
holders were forced to ‘jump of the fence’ and commit themselves to a discrete choice.  
 
Method 
Participants and design. 67 students (16 male, 51 female) of the University of 
Amsterdam participated in the experiment in return for course credit or money (7 euros). Age 
of participants ranged from 18 to 26 years (M = 20.97, SD = 1.91). Seven participants were 
excluded from further analyses because they failed to correctly follow the experimental 
procedure or expressed suspicion regarding the cover story. Participants were randomly 
assigned to either the ambivalence with choice condition, the ambivalence without choice 
condition or the control (univalent) condition. 
Materials. Skin Conductance Level (SCL) was used to measure physiological arousal. 
SCL was recorded by attaching two electrodes to the medial phalanges of the index- and 
middle finger. The hand with the electrodes was always the passive one and remained in rest 
throughout the experiment. The electrodes were connected to a GRS measurement device 
consisting of an input device and an output amplifier. The range of the input device was 
approximately 0 to 100 S (micro-Siemens). The output amplifier adjusted the signal (50 Hz) 
from the input device to S (covering 0 to 100 S), which was sent to a personal computer, 
where the signal was converted to data representing S over periods of 10 seconds.  
We assessed both potential ambivalence and felt ambivalence. The former was 
assessed by using the split semantic differential procedure suggested by Kaplan (1972). We 
asked participants “how positive are your thoughts about the new labor law?” with a 4-point 
response scale ranging from not at all positive (1) to very positive. We assessed the negative 
component with a similar measure. Subsequently we calculated a potential ambivalence score 
using the formula by Thompson, Zanna, and Griffin (1995): (P + N)/2 – [P – N]. The rationale 
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behind this formula is that strong positive and negative feelings are related to higher levels of 
ambivalence. Scores on this measure could range from -2 to 4.  
Felt ambivalence was assessed using two different measures. The first was based on 
Jamieson (1993), consisting of two items (r = .88) like: “I feel torn between the two sides of 
the new employment law”. Responses could range from completely disagree (1) to completely 
agree (9). The second was a measure by Priester and Petty’s (1996), consisting of three items 
such as “Towards the introduction of the new employment law I feel….”, with a response 
scale ranging from no conflict at all (1) to maximum conflict (9). Cronbach’s  was .92. 
Overall attitude was measured with two 9-point scales (r = .96) ranging from negative (1) to 
positive (9) and from bad (1) to good (9). Participants were presented with each of these items 
on the computer screen and responded by pressing buttons on a switch box. 
Procedure. Upon arrival, participants were seated in front of a computer screen and 
after attaching the electrodes to the participants’ index- and middle-finger, participants were 
told to relax and wait for the experiment to begin. The experimenter went to an adjoining 
room and started the program.  
The experiment started off with an adaptation period of three minutes. Subsequently 
the baseline period of six minutes started, during which a quiet wildlife movie was shown 
(Phase 1). When the movie was finished, subjects were asked to turn around a piece of paper 
with the ambivalent or univalent text on it and read the text. Next they completed the 
ambivalence items and overall attitude measure. Subsequently the coverstory appeared 
onscreen (Phase 2).  
In this coverstory, participants were told they would be asked to write an essay on the 
attitudinal topic. They were told that a random selection of the essays written during the 
course of the experiment would be published in the student newspaper of the University of 
Amsterdam. Participants in the ambivalence with choice condition were told they had to 
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choose between writing an essay that was positive about the labor law or one that was 
negative about the law. Participants in the ambivalence without choice and control conditions 
were not instructed to choose a side and could thus write an essay as moderate as they wanted.  
All participants then had five minutes to think about the content of their essay. 
Participants in the ambivalent choice condition were first instructed to make a discrete choice 
with respect to the viewpoint in their essay. They could press ’1’ for an essay in favor or press 
‘2’ for an essay against the employment law. After doing so all participants were instructed to 
wait (Phase 3). After 30 seconds of waiting, the experimenter came in, and removed the 
electrodes. Participants wrote their essay, after which they were thanked, debriefed and 
rewarded for their participation. An overview of the procedure is presented in Table 1. 
 
Results 
Manipulation checks. To assess whether the ambivalence induction was successful, we 
examined the scores on the ambivalence and attitude measures in each of the experimental 
conditions. Results indicate that on each measure of ambivalence participants reading the 
ambivalent newspaper article reported higher levels of ambivalence as compared to 
participants in the control condition. Moreover, participants who read the ambivalent article 
reported an attitude around midpoint of the scale, while participants who read the univalent 
(negative) article reported an attitude that was significantly more negative. These results, 
summarized in Table 2, clearly indicate that the manipulation of ambivalence was successful. 
In order to examine whether participants in the ambivalent choice condition are 
committed to their decision, we examined if the essays in this condition were more polarized 
than in the ambivalence without choice condition. We entered the number of positive and 
negative arguments in each of the essays in the same formula we used to calculate 
ambivalence scores (Thompson et al., 1995). This led to polarization scores ranging from -3.5 
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to 2.5, with lower scores indicating more polarization. A one-way Anova comparing the two 
ambivalence conditions shows a significant difference, F(1, 39) = 20.65, p < .001. 
Participants who do not have to choose are less extreme in their essays (M = .19, SD = 1.64), 
as compared to their choosing counterparts (M = -1.73, SD = .95). In other words, participants 
who had to choose were indeed committed to their choice. 
SCL and ambivalence.  The strength of a SCL signal varies across different skin types, 
and thus individual differences are quite large. As recommended by Ben-Shakhar (1985) we 
chose to examine the change in SCL on an individual level.  For every participant we 
subtracted the mean SCL signal during the baseline movie (SCL-base) from the mean SCL 
signal during a phase in the experiment. This difference was then divided by SCL-base and 
multiplied by 100. Thus we calculated the relative increase in arousal for each participant in 
each phase.  
Examination of the differences between conditions showed some modest differences   
before participants made their choice. At Phase 2, in the non-ambivalent (control) condition 
SCL had increased by 29.51 % (SD = 13.65). In the ambivalence-without -choice condition 
the increase was 32.12 % (SD = 14.98) and in the ambivalence with choice condition 38.85% 
(SD = 20.48). LSD post-hoc tests revealed that the difference between the ambivalent choice 
condition and univalent control condition approaches significance (p = .079), while the 
comparisons between ambivalence-without choice and control remained non-significant (p = 
.623). 
As Figure 1 clearly shows, differences between conditions were most pronounced 
after participants in the ambivalent choice condition had committed themselves to a pro or 
con standpoint on the issue. At that point SCL had increased by 31.36 % (SD = 17.28) in the 
non-ambivalent (control) condition. In the ambivalence without choice condition the increase 
was 38.86 % (SD = 17.35) and in the ambivalence with choice condition 50.99% (SD = 
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22.27). A one-way Anova showed a significant effect of condition, F(2, 58) = 6.04, p = .004. 
LSD posthoc tests showed that the ambivalent choice condition differed significantly from the 
control condition (p = .001) and from the ambivalent-no-choice condition (p = .034). The 
ambivalent condition without choice did not differ from the control condition (p = .22).  
To examine whether differences between conditions gradually became more 
pronounced throughout the experiment, we performed a repeated measures analysis with SCL 
increase during the three phases (baseline, pre-choice, post-choice) as a within-subjects factor 
and experimental condition as between-subjects factor. Results showed a significant 
interaction between condition and time, F(2, 58) = 3.94, p = .025. Moreover, within-subjects 
contrasts showed a linear trend for this interaction, F(2, 58) = 5.49, p = .007. In other words, 
the increase in SCL was lowest in the control condition, highest in the ambivalence choice 
condition, with the ambivalent-no-choice participants in-between.  
 
Discussion 
Results of this first study support our hypothesis that ambivalence is only unpleasant 
when one has to choose and commit oneself to one side of an issue. We did not test why 
exactly this choice makes ambivalence so unpleasant, and why this is most pronounced after 
the decision. One explanation for the latter finding is that ambivalent attitude holders find the 
dissonance itself uncomfortable. Each side of the issue is only partly in accordance with their 
attitude and they could feel ‘caught between a rock and a hard place’.  
This may be the case, but arousal is clearly already on the increase before the choice. 
Therefore, again building upon work on dissonance theory, we suggest that a different 
variable plays an important role. Cooper and Fazio (1984) argued that the anticipated 
consequences of evaluative conflict are important. Cooper and Worchel (1970), Cooper, 
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Zanna, and Goethals, (1974) and Scher and Cooper (1989) have shown that when 
counterattitudinal behavior has no negative consequences, no dissonance is experienced.  
We would like to argue that the anticipated consequences of the choice also drive the 
effects observed in Study 1. We believe ambivalent attitude holders making a discrete choice 
anticipate potential outcomes associated with each of the alternatives. Moreover, the 
outcomes associated with each of the alternatives are uncertain, and this uncertainty results in 
discomfort and arousal. The ambivalent attitude holder who can remain on the fence does not 
have to think about potential consequences or outcomes and will experience feelings of 
uncertainty to a lesser extent, or not at all.  
Uncertainty about outcomes can also explain why in Study 1 ambivalent participants 
particularly feel uncomfortable after choosing. After commitment to a choice alternative, one 
will inevitably have to deal with the (at that point uncertain) outcomes associated with it. In 
other words, the ambivalent attitude holder has not only committed to a choice alternative, but 
also to the uncertain outcomes associated with it. The results of Study 1 indeed indicate that 
arousal, which was already increasing in the pre-decisional stage, was further enhanced after 
the decision was made. 
In short, we think uncertainty about the possible outcomes of one’s decision was the 
underlying variable explaining the pattern of results obtained in Study 1. Moreover, 
ambivalence is particularly experienced as uncomfortable when a choice has to be made, 
because only then people will worry about the uncertain consequences of their choice. This 
uncertainty is thus associated with arousal and discomfort.  
 
Study 2 
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In this study we aim to replicate and extend the findings of Study 1. In the present 
study, we also assess experienced uncertainty regarding the consequences of the choice.  We 
expect that levels of uncertainty would show a pattern similar to that of the SCL increase in 
Study 1. It is also expected that uncertainty mediates the impact of the experimental 
manipulation on SCL. 
 
Method 
Participants and design. 80 students from the University of Amsterdam participated in 
the experiment in return for course credit. Eight participants were excluded from further 
analyses, because they failed to correctly follow the experimental procedure or expressed 
suspicion regarding the cover story. The final sample thus consisted of 72 participants, 9 male 
and 63 female. Age of participants ranged from 17 to 34 (M = 20.13, SD = 3.19). Participants 
were randomly assigned to either the ambivalence with choice condition, the ambivalence 
without choice condition or the control (univalent) condition. 
Materials. Skin Conductance Level and overall attitude were measured in exactly the 
same manner as in Study 1. We did incorporate a change with respect to the ambivalence 
measures. Because we are examining ambivalence-induced discomfort, we decided to focus 
on the felt ambivalence measures and exclude the potential ambivalence measure used in 
Study 1. 
We also measured the extent to which participants felt insecure about the potential 
consequences of their choice. We did this by asking participants:  “I am uncertain whether I 
will make the right decision” and “I am uncertain whether the other option will turn out to be 
better”. Both items (r = .62) were measured on a scale ranging from very certain (1) to very 
uncertain (9). Uncertainty was measured immediately after the coverstory. The remaining 
phases were identical to Study 1. 
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Results 
Manipulation checks. As in the previous study we examined the scores on the ambivalence 
and attitude measures in each of the experimental conditions. Again the results (summarized 
in Table 3) indicate that the manipulation of ambivalence was successful. Participants who 
had to choose also seemed more committed to their choice, as indicated by the essays of 
participants in the ambivalence choice condition being more polarized (M = -2.00, SD = .96) 
as compared to those in the ambivalence no-choice condition (M = .26, SD = 1.91), F(1, 50) = 
28.39, p < .001).  
SCL and ambivalence. We first calculated for each participant the relative increase in 
arousal, as compared to baseline and examined the development in SCL in each of the 
conditions. Examination of the pre-choice differences between conditions showed that before 
participants made a choice SCL has increased by 25.13 % (SD = 14.25) in the non-ambivalent 
(control) condition. In the ambivalence without choice condition the increase was 28.19 % 
(SD = 22.88) and in the ambivalence with choice condition the increase was clearly higher, 
37.63% (SD = 21.65). LSD post-hoc tests revealed that the difference between the ambivalent 
choice condition and univalent control condition was significant (p = .035), while the 
comparison between ambivalent no-choice and univalent control was not (p = .58).  
As in the previous study, differences between conditions were more pronounced after 
the decision. As Figure 2 shows, in the course of the experiment SCL increased by 29.99 % 
(SD = 18) in the non-ambivalent (control) condition. In the ambivalence-without-choice 
condition the increase was 35.17 % (SD = 27.32). SCL increase was highest in the 
ambivalence with choice condition 59.23 % (SD = 63.8). As in Study 1, a one-way Anova 
shows a significant effect of condition, F(2, 69) = 3.47, p = .037. LSD posthoc tests show that 
the ambivalent choice condition differed significantly from the control condition (p = .015) 
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and the ambivalent no choice condition (p = .044). The ambivalent condition without choice 
did not differ from the control condition (p = .65).  
Finally, we carried out a repeated measures analysis with SCL increase during the 
three phases (baseline, pre-choice, post-choice) as a within-subjects factor and experimental 
condition as between-subjects factor. Results confirm those of Study 1, and showed a 
significant interaction between condition and time, F(2, 69) = 3.09, p = .018. As before, the 
analysis of within subjects contrasts showed a significant linear trend, F(2, 69) = 3.47, p = 
.037. 
Uncertainty. We computed a new variable based on the mean of the two uncertainty 
items and performed a one-way Anova to test for differences between conditions. This 
analysis approaches significance level, F(2, 69) = 2.57, p = .08. LSD posthoc tests revealed 
significant differences between the ambivalent choice condition (M = 4.86, SD = 1.35), on the 
one hand, and the control (M = 4.30, SD = .95) and ambivalence no choice (M = 4.30, SD = 
.48) conditions on the other, (both p = .05). Participants were less certain about the 
consequences of their essay in the ambivalent choice condition than in the other two 
conditions. 
Next, we examined whether uncertainty mediated the effect of our experimental 
manipulation on SCL. A mediational analysis with uncertainty and condition as predictors of 
arousal indicated that uncertainty fully mediated the effect of experimental condition on 
arousal (Sobel’s Z = 1.95, p = .05). In other words choice-related ambivalence is 
uncomfortable because it is associated with uncertainty about the consequences of the 
decision. 
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Discussion 
The results of the first two studies indicate that ambivalence is particularly unpleasant when a 
choice has to be made. Moreover, ambivalence-induced discomfort appears to be caused by 
feelings of uncertainty regarding the potential consequences of the choice. A few questions 
remain however.  
 First, the previous studies did not examine univalent choices. At first glance there is 
not much reason to assume that univalent choices will be associated with discomfort. For 
example, most non-smokers will not experience choice-related discomfort when they are 
offered a cigarette. Nonetheless we decided to add a third experiment to exclude this possible 
explanation. 
 Second, theoretically it is possible that the arousal we have found to be related to 
ambivalence is pleasant. Based on earlier work on dissonance and arousal (Elliot & Devine, 
1994) this appears unlikely, but in our third study we also aim to address this possibility and 
assess the evaluative nature of the arousal associated with choice. 
 
Study 3 
In this last study we orthogonally manipulate ambivalence and choice, concerning a new 
attitude object: the potential introduction of an ‘energy tax’. We expect discomfort to be most 
pronounced when ambivalence is high and a choice has to be made. To establish the valence 
of the ambivalence-induced arousal we found earlier, we now assess discomfort using self-
report measures of affect. 
 
Method 
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Participants and design. 99 students from the University of Amsterdam participated in 
the experiment in return for course credit (28 male and 71 female). Age of participants ranged 
from 18 to 36 (M = 21.13, SD = 3.19). By orthogonally manipulating ambivalence and choice 
we created a 2 (ambivalence high/low) x 2 (choice yes/no) design. Participants were randomly 
distributed over experimental conditions. 
  Materials. As in the previous study ambivalence was manipulated using fake 
newspaper articles that were either ambivalent or negative (univalent). We used a different 
attitude object in this study; the potential introduction of a tax on the use of energy, 
supposedly with the intention of protecting the environment through the discouragement of 
careless energy use. Ambivalence was measured using the Jamieson (1993) and Priester and 
Petty (1996) measures (alpha’s were .93 and .72). Choice was manipulated by asking 
participants to write an essay, similar as in the previous studies.  
We measured experienced affect after participants were told that they would have to 
write an essay but before the actual decision. We first measured general positive and negative 
affect by asking the following questions: “How many negative feelings do you have at this 
moment?” and “How many positive feelings do you have at this moment?” both measured on 
a 7-point scale ranging from none at all to many. We also measured more specific emotions; 
anxiety, regret and fear. We asked participants the extent to which they experienced each of 
the emotions on a 7-point scale ranging from scale from not at all to very much.  
 
Results 
 
Manipulation checks. We first examined the scores on the ambivalence and attitude 
measures in each of the experimental conditions. Results (summarized in Table 4) indicate 
that the manipulation of ambivalence was successful. 
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 General Affect. First we examined differences between conditions in terms of overall 
positive and negative affect. The results on positive affect show a marginal interaction 
between ambivalence and choice, F(3,95) = 3.20, p = .077. More specifically we found the 
lowest score on positive feelings for participants in the ambivalent choice condition (M = 
4.00, SD = .24) as compared to the ambivalent no choice (M = 4.55, SD = .25), univalent no-
choice (M = 4.27, SD = .23) and, in the light of the specific aims of this study most 
importantly, the univalent choice condition (M = 4.58, SD = .23). On overall negative affect 
we found a significant interaction between ambivalence and choice, F(3,95) = 6.20, p = .014. 
Here participants in the ambivalent choice condition reported most negative feelings (M = 
4.20, SD = .29) as compared to the ambivalent no choice (M = 3.00, SD = .31), univalent no-
choice (M = 3.54, SD = .29) and the univalent choice condition (M = 3.27, SD = .29). A 
specific analysis of contrast confirmed this pattern, t(95) = 2.75, p = .007. 
 Specific emotions. We also measured three more specific emotions; regret, anxiety and 
fear and on a composite score on these emotions we find a significant interaction between 
ambivalence and choice, F(3,95) = 2.87, p = .04. The ambivalent choice condition reported 
most negative emotions (M = 3.12, SD = .22) as compared to the ambivalent no choice (M = 
2.20, SD = .24), univalent no-choice (M = 2.49, SD = .22) and the univalent choice condition 
(M = 2.50, SD = .22), A specific analysis of contrast confirmed this pattern, t(95) = 2.79, p = 
.0061.  
Overall, these findings confirm that the effects we found earlier on physiological 
arousal are not caused by choice alone, but by the combination of ambivalence and choice. 
Moreover, the results indicate that ambivalence-induced arousal is indeed unpleasant.  
 
General Discussion 
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In research on attitudes it has long been assumed that ambivalence is unpleasant 
because people have a general preference for consistency. The current studies show that this is 
indeed the case, but particularly when the ambivalence can no longer remain non-committal 
and one has to choose between the two conflicting cognitions. When there is no need to 
choose, and one can hold on to the status quo, ambivalence is not more stressful than holding 
a univalent attitude. For example, if someone feels ambivalent about the benefits of private 
versus public schooling, this does not have to be stressful as long as there is no need to choose 
one of these options for ones children.  
The current results suggest that when ambivalence is high, choice is unpleasant 
because of the uncertainty about the consequences of the choice. In other words, we feel 
uncomfortable when facing a jump off the fence, because we fear we may make the wrong 
decision and will have to deal with unwanted consequences. This reason for discomfort is in 
line with earlier research on dissonance, which has shown that consequences play a pivotal 
role in the relation between inconsistency and post-behavioral discomfort (i.e. Cooper & 
Fazio, 1984). We show that the anticipated consequences also play a role regarding pre-
decisional ambivalence. 
One aspect of these studies needs to be emphasized. The effects on SCL in studies 1 
and 2 and the effects on the self-report measures in studies 2 and 3 reflect pre-decisional 
discomfort. However, in the first two studies differences between conditions are most 
pronounced after participants in the choice-condition have made a choice. We believe this is 
because from that moment on, they will have to deal with the uncertain consequences. Only 
after the choice, the consequences become inevitable, while the exact nature of the 
consequences at that point remains unclear. This shows that it is not the ambivalence per se 
that leads to discomfort, but the uncertainty about the consequences of a choice. Using the 
analogy by Hogarth (1981) described in the introduction; the ambivalent attitude holder who 
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has pulled the trigger remains uncertain until he knows whether or not the bullet has hit the 
target. 
The current results also show that when ambivalence is indeed associated with 
physiological discomfort, this is because of the activation of specific emotions. Ambivalence-
induced discomfort apparently is not a diffuse affective state, but one that is associated with 
uncertainty and decision-related emotions such as regret, fear and anxiety.  
 Finally, we would like to argue that the different physiological patterns in our two 
ambivalence conditions suggest that in theorizing about ambivalence we should distinguish 
between different types of ambivalence. The current results suggest that having mixed 
feelings about one attitude object is fundamentally different than being pulled towards (or 
pushed away from) two opposing behavioral alternatives. In other words, despite the fact that 
The Clash’s late frontman Joe Strummer may have felt unpleasant when he expressed 
ambivalence: “I got a heart, I got a mind, but I can’t keep them in time”, he most likely felt 
more distress when confronted with an actual choice: “Should I stay or should I go? If I go 
there will be trouble, if I stay it will be double”.   
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Footnote 
 
1. We also measured a fourth specific emotion; anger. Interestingly, on this emotion 
(less obviously related to the decision) we found no significant effects (F < 1). This suggests 
that the effects of ambivalence on arousal are not merely due to an overall affective response, 
but to an association with specific emotions, namely regret, anxiety and fear. 
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Figure captions 
Figure 1: Relative SCL increase (%) by condition, compared to baseline, Study 1. 
Figure 2: Relative SCL increase (%) by condition, compared to baseline, Study 2. 
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Table 1. Overview of Study 1 
 Experimental condition 
Condition Ambivalent with choice Ambivalent without choice Non-ambivalent condition 
 Adaptation (3 min.) Adaptation (3 min.) Adaptation (3 min.) 
Phase 1 Baseline movie (6 min.) Baseline movie (6 min.) Baseline movie (6 min.) 
Phase 2 Coverstory 1 (1 min.) Coverstory 2 (1 min.) Coverstory 2 (1 min.) 
 Making choice - - 
Phase 3 Waiting  (30 sec.) Waiting (30 sec) Waiting (30 sec) 
Note. When no indication of time is given, participants manually proceeded by pushing 
‘continue’ on the switchbox.  
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Table 2. Manipulation checks, Study 1. 
 Ambivalent text Univalent text 
Measure M SD M SD 
Jamieson (1-9) 5.50 1.60 2.85** 1.84 
Priester & Petty (1-9) 5.88 1.41 3.72** 1.95 
Potential ambivalence (-2-4) 2.11   .85 1.55* 1.11 
Attitude (1-9) 5.04 1.49 2.78** 1.54 
* p < .05, ** p <.001 
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Table 3. Manipulation checks, Study 2. 
 
 Ambivalent text Univalent text 
Measure M SD M SD 
Jamieson (1-9) 4.94 1.47 3.61* 1.66 
Priester & Petty (1-9) 5.60 1.45 4.08* 1.86 
Attitude (1-9) 5.17 1.42 2.78* 1.28 
* p < .001 
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Table 4. Manipulation checks, Study 3. 
 
 Ambivalent text Univalent text 
Measure M SD M SD 
Jamieson (1-7) 3.84 1.53 2.98* 1.53 
Priester & Petty (1-7) 4.03 0.62 3.37** 0.77 
Attitude (1-7) 4.27 1.64 3.10** 1.51 
* p < .01 
** p < .001 
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